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CONTRIBUTIONS OF COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 
TO QUESTIONNAIRE CONSTRUCTION
NORBERT SCHWARZ
Norbert Schwan received degrees in sociology (Dipl.-Soz., Dr. phil.) from ihc Universily of 
Mannheim and in psychology (Dr. phil. habil.) from Ihe University of Heidelberg. He has held 
visiting appointments at North American universities, and he currently directs a research pro­
gram on cognitive aspects of survey methodology at Ihe Zentrum für Umfragen, Methoden und 
Analysen (ZUM A), in Mannheim. Federal Republic of Germany, and is Privatdozenl of Psy­
chology at the University of Heidelberg. His research interests focus on human judgmental pro­
cesses, in particular Ihe interplay of affect and cognition, and Ihc application of social cognition 
research lo survey methodology.
M uch of our knowledge about individuals' behavior is based on their direct 
verbal reports. From consumer behavior to health problems, and from 
styles of parenting to the nation’s unemployment rale or the prevalence of 
crime, psychologists and social scientists rely on respondents’ behavioral 
reports as their major data base for testing theories of human behavior and 
offering advice on public policy. Given the importance of behavioral reports, 
surprisingly little attention has been given to how respondents go about 
answering quantitative autobiographical questions, asking them, for exam­
ple, how often they have done something, or how much of something they 
have consumed, during a specified time period. As an introduction to the 
issues raised in the present chapter, the reader may want to answer the fol­
lowing questions, which are taken from major U.S. surveys:
1. During the two-week [reference] period, on the days when you drank liquor, 
about how many drinks did you have? (Health Interview Survey Supplement, 
National Center for Health Statistics)
AUTHOR'S NOTE: Paris of the research reported here were supported by granls Schw 
278/2 and Sir 264/3 from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft lo the author and Frilz St rack, 
by a Feodor Lynen Fellowship from Ihe Alexander von Humboldl Foundation to the author, and 
by ZUMA's program on cognition and survey research. Thanks are extended lo Barbara Bick- 
art, Bettina Scheuring, and Fritz Strack for their helpful comments on a previous drafl.
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2. Now, I’d like lo read you a short list of different kinds of pain, Please say for each 
one, on roughly how many days- if any-in the lasl 12 monlhs you have had lhai 
type of pain. How many days in the last year have you had [hcadaches; back­
aches; stomach pains; joint pains; muscle pains; dental pains]? (Health Inter­
view Survey Supplement, National Center for Health Statistics)
3. We would like lo ask [your/your relative's! work history for every job and every 
period of unemployment thal lasted 6 monlhs or more, starting with the first 
full-time job [you/hc| held from the age of 16. including any jobs held while in 
military service. | . . . | About how many hours a week did (you/he) work on 
that (first) job, including overtime? ("Women at Work” Study, U.S. Bureau oi the 
Census)
4. When you were growing up, how frequently did your father attend religious ser­
vices? (General Social Survey, National Opinion Research Center)
The present chapter reviews our current knowledge of the cognitive pro­
cesses thal underlie respondents’ answers to quantitative questions such as 
(he ones above, paying special attention to the methodological implications 
of the reviewed findings for questionnaire construction. Much of the 
research is fairly new, growing out of the recently initiated dialogue between 
survey researchers and cognitive psychologists (see Hippier, Schwarz, & 
Sudman, 1987; Jabinc, Straf, Tanur, &  Tourangeau, 1984, for reviews), as 
well as the recent inierest in autobiographical memory (see Gruneberg, 
Morris, & Sykes, 1988; Neisser, 1982; Rubin 1986).
THE PROCESS OF QUESTION ANSWERING
Answering a quantitative autobiographical question requires that respon­
dents undertake several tasks. First, respondents need to understand what 
the question refers to, and which behavior they are supposed lo report. Sec­
ond, they have to recall or reconstruci relevant instances of this behavior 
from memory. Third, if the question specifies a reference period, they must 
determine if these instances occurred during this reference period or not. 
Similarly, if the question refers to their “usual” behavior, respondents have 
to determine if the recalled or reconstructed instances are reasonably repre­
sentative or if they reflect a deviation from their usual behavior. Fourth, as 
an alternative to recalling or reconstructing instances of the behavior, 
respondents may rely on their general knowledge, or other salient informa­
tion that may bear on their task, to infer an answer. Finally, respondents have 
lo provide their report to the researcher. They may need to map their report 
onto a response scale provided to them, and they may want to edit it for rea­
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sons of social desirability (see Slrack &  Marlin, 1987; Tourangeau &  Rasin- 
ski, 1988, for related discussions of attitude questions).
In (he first part of this chapter, each of these tasks will be discussed in 
some detail. For the sake oF simplicity, this discussion will assume that (he 
question is asked in an open response format, and that no prccoded response 
alternatives are provided to the respondent. As the review develops, it will 
become evident that answering autobiographical questions is a process (hat 
is highly theory-driven, and relies as much on respondents’ inference strate­
gies as on their recall of specific autobiographical details. The second part 
of the chapter will then explore a specific set of inference rules, namely, 
respondents’ assumptions about the informational value of response alterna­
tives provided to them by (he researcher. Focusing on whai respondent 
learn from response alternatives, this section will address the special issues 
that arise at various stages of the judgment process when respondents are 
asked to report their behavior by checking the appropriate alternative from 
a set of response categories in a closed answer format.
ANSWERING BEHAVIORAL QUESTIONS 
IN AN OPEN RESPONSE FORMAT
Understanding (he Question
The key issue at the question-comprchension stage is whether (he 
behavior that (he respondent identifies as the referent of the question does or 
does not match what the researcher had in mind. As a general rule, question 
comprehension is considerably poorer than most researchers would like to 
believe, even for apparently simple questions (Belson, 1981). For example, 
in a British readership survey (Belson, 1968), respondents were presented 
an aided recall task: "I want you to go through this booklet with me, and tell 
me, for each paper, whether you happen to have looked at any copy of it in 
(he past three months, it doesn't matter where" (p. 2). Subsequently, respon­
dents were asked to explain the key terms of the question. The interpreta­
tions of "looked at" ranged from “seen on a bookstall" to “ read fairly fully,” 
and included “ like to read," “bought," and “taken regularly." The phrase “any 
copy" was frequently overlooked or interpreted to mean "your own copy,” 
and the reference period of three months tended to be ignored or became a 
vague “ recently." Belson concluded that respondents who find a question 
difficult to answer are "likely to modify it in such a way that it becomes more 
easy to answer" (p. 9). In particular, they are likely to interpret broad terms
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less broadly than intended, and to respond to the gist of the question rather 
than to its exact wording. Moreover, respondents may use the response alter­
natives provided to them by the researcher to determine the meaning of the 
question, as will be elaborated below.
In addition to these general comprehension problems (see Belson, 1981; 
Hippier & Schwarz, 1987; Strack &  Martin, 1987 for reviews of related 
research), respondents' definition of certain behaviors may vary depending 
upon who is supposed to engage in the behavior. For example, the concept 
of “paid work," which is crucial for most labor force surveys, was found to 
include very different activities depending on the target person’s age, educa­
tion, and employment history. What qualifies as "paid work" for the respon­
dent's teenage children (e.g., baby-sitting or mowing the neighbor's lawn) 
does not qualify as “paid work" for the adult respondent, resulting in differ­
ent definitions of the class of target behaviors as a function of the employ­
ment history of the target person (Schwarz, 1987). Thus the same question 
may result in the assessment of different behaviors, rendering the reports 
noncomparable.
Recalling Relevant Instances
Once respondents have formed a subjective understanding of what the 
question refers to, they need to retrieve relevant information about the 
behavior under study from memory. Ideally, most researchers would like 
(he respondent to scan the reference period, retrieve all instances that match 
the target behavior, and count them in order to determine the overall fre­
quency of the behavior during the reference period. This, however, is the 
route that respondents are least likely to lake.
In fact, exept for rare and very important behaviors, respondents are 
unlikely to have detailed representations of numerous individual instances of 
a behavior stored in memory, and may be expccted to blend details of various 
instances into one global representation of the behavior under study (Union, 
1982; Means, Mingay, Nigam, &  Zarrow, 1988; Neisser, 1986; Wickelgren, 
1976), Thus many individual episodes become indistinguishable or 
irretrievable, due to interference from other similar instances (Baddeley & 
Hitch, 1977; Wagenaar, 1986), fostering the generation of knowledgelike 
representations that “ lack specific lime or location indicators" (Strube, 1987, 
p. 89). The finding that a single spell of unemployment is more accurately 
recalled than multiple spells (Mathiowelz, 1986), for example, suggests that 
this phenomenon applies not only to mundane and unimportant behaviors, 
but also to repeated experiences that profoundly affect an individual’s life.
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Accordingly, a “recall and couni” model does not provide an appropriate 
description of how people answer frequency questions about frequent 
behaviors or experiences. Rather, their answers are likely to be based on 
some fragmented recall and the application of inference rules to compute a 
frequency estimate, as will be described below (see Blair &  Burton, 1987; 
Bradburn, Rips, &  Shevell, 1987; Means et al.,1988).
If  researchers are interested in obtaining reports that are based on 
recalled episodes, they may simplify respondents’ task by providing appro­
priate recall cues. This, however, is more easily said than done. Theoreti­
cally, the most efficient recall cues are cues that match respondents' 
encodings of the target behavior. But, unfortunately, research on everyday 
memory is a relatively recent field of study and little is known about respon­
dents' habits of encoding for specific classes of everyday events. For exam­
ple, while researchers may be interested in how often respondents drink 
alcoholic beverages, respondents may be unlikely to encode “drinking alco­
holic beverages” as a separate category. Therefore, providing them with a 
selection of common situations (seeing friends, watching TV, having dinner, 
and so on) in which they may consume alcohol may provide better recall 
cues (Strube, 1987). In the absence of specific knowledge about the 
representation of everyday behaviors, breaking down a global question into 
several more specific ones and using short rather than long reference periods 
were found to improve respondents’ recall and to increase the likelihood that 
respondents used a recall rather than an estimation strategy.
For example, a question about how often a respondent has eaten out may 
be broken down into a series of separate questions about eating at different 
types of restaurants. A recent experiment indicated that when respondents 
were asked to report separately how often they had eaten dinner in Chinese, 
Greek, Italian, American, Mexican, and fast-food restaurants, they reported 
an average of 26.0 trips in a three-month period, compared to 20.5 trips 
reported when they were asked the more general question, "How many 
times have you eaten dinner in a regular or fast-food restaurant?” (Sudman 
&  Schwarz, 1987). Moreover, when respondents were asked to report res­
taurant visits only for the previous month, they reported about 13.7 visits, a 
monthly average substantially greater than the range of 7-9 visits found by 
dividing the three-month totals by three.
In addition, varying the reference period and the specificity of the ques­
tion affected respondents' strategies, as was previously reported by Blair and 
Burton (1987). When asked only about the previous month, most respon­
dents (62%) reported that they tried to remember specific events. For the
Norbert Schwarz 103
three-month period, only about one-third (32%) of those asked the general 
question about all restaurants tried to remember specific events, while 
slightly more than half (56%) reported using an estimation strategy. For 
respondents asked about specific types of restaurants For three months, the 
majority (54%) reported using a mixed strategy. Specifically, they tried to 
remember specific trips to some kinds of restaurants — namely, the ones 
rarely visited —and estimated for other types. Thus respondents were more 
likely to use an estimation strategy the larger the number of similar experi­
ences, presumably because repeated similar experiences are difficult to 
retrieve individually.
In general, the quality of recall will improve as the retrieval cues 
presented in the body of the question, or on an accompanying list of exam­
ples, become more specific. There is, however, an important drawback to 
the use of specific questions: Respondents are likely to omit instances that 
do not match the specific questions or examples, resulting in underreports if 
the list is not exhaustive. Thus, in the above example, visits to a restaurant 
not included in the set of specific questions are likely lo be omitted even if 
a final question asks if the respondent ate at any "other" restaurant (sec Sud- 
man &  Bradburn, 1983).
In providing specific recall cues, it is important to note that different cues 
are differentially effective. Thus the date of an event is usually found to be 
a poor cue, whereas cues pertaining to what happened, where it happened, 
and who was involved have been found to be very effective (Wagenaar, 19S6, 
1988). In addition, recall will improve when respondents are given sufficient 
time to search memory, Recalling specific events, such as going out for a 
drink, may take up to several seconds (Reiser, Black, &  Abelson, 1985), and 
repeated attempts to recall may result in the retrieval of additional material, 
even after a considerable number of previous trials (e.g.. Means et al., 1988; 
Williams &  Hollan, 1981). Unfortunately, respondents are unlikely to have 
sufficient lime to engage in repeated retrieval attempts in most research situ­
ations (and may often not be motivated to do so even if they had the lime). 
This is particularly crucial in the context of survey research, where ihc 
available lime per question is usually less than one minute (Bradburn et al., 
1987; Groves &. Kahn, 1979).
Moreover, the direction in which respondents search memory has been 
found to influence the quality of recall. Specifically, better recall is achieved 
when respondents begin with the most recent occurrence of a behavior and 
work backward in time than when they begin at the beginning of the refer­
ence period (e.g., Loftus & Falhi, 1985; Whitten & Leonard, 1981). This
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presumably occurs because memory for recent occurrences is richer and the 
recalled instances may serve as cues for recalling previous ones. Given free 
choice, however, respondents tend to prefer the less efficient strategy of for­
ward recall. Even under optimal conditions, however, respondents will fre­
quently be unable to recall an event or some of its critical details, even if they 
believed they would “certainly” remember it at the time it occurred (e.g., 
Linton. 1975; Thompson, 1982; Wagenaar, 1986). In general, the available 
evidence suggests that respondents are likely to underreport behaviors and 
events, which has led many researchers to assume that higher reports of 
mundane behaviors are likely to be more valid. Accordingly, a “ the more the 
better" rule is frequently substituted for external validity checks.
Dating Recalled Instances
After recalling or reconstructing a specific instance of the behavior under 
study, respondents have to determine if this instance occurred during the 
reference period. This requires that they understand the extension of the 
reference period and that they can accurately date the instance with regard 
to that period.
Reference periods that are defined in terms of several weeks or months are 
highly susceptible to misinterpretations. For example, the phrase “during the 
last twelve months" has been found to be construed as u reference to the last 
calendar year, as including or excluding the currcnt month, and so on. Simi­
larly, anchoring the reference period with a specific date—for example, “Since 
March I, how often . . . is not very helpful because respondents will 
usually not be able to relate an abstract date to meaningful memories.
Not surprisingly, the most efficient way to anchor a reference period is the 
use of salient personal or public events, often referred to as "landmarks" 
(Loflus & Marburger, 1983). In addition to improving respondents’ under­
standing of the reference period, the use of landmarks facilitates the dating 
of recalled instances. Given that the calendar date of an event will usually 
not be among its encoded features, respondents were found to relate recalled 
events to other, more outstanding events in order to reconstruct the exact 
time and day (e.g., Baddeley, Lewis, &  Nimmo-Smith, 1978). Accordingly, 
using public events (such as the eruption of Mount Saint Helens), important 
personal memories that respondents were asked to think of, or outstanding 
dates (such as New Year’s Eve) as landmarks was found to reduce dating 
biases (Loftus &  Marburger, 1983; Means et al., 1988). A related proce­
dure, called “bounded recall" (Neter &  Waksberg, 1964), has been devel­
oped for use in repeated interviews, where data from the previous interview
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serve as landmarks and recall cues. However, the high cost of repeated inter­
views frequently discourages its use, although Sudman, Finn, and Lannom 
(1984) adapted the procedure for use in single interviews.
Wilhoul a chance to relate a recalled event to a well-dated landmark or a 
personal “time line” (Means et al., 1988), time dating is likely to reflect both 
"forward” and “backward iclescoping." That is, distant events are assumed to 
have happened more recently than they did, whereas recent events are 
assumed lo be more distant than they are (e.g., Brown, Rips, &  Shevell, 
1985, 1986). Moreover, respondents have been found to use the clarity and 
vividness of their memory as a cue to the distance of the event, assuming that 
events thal arc recalled in detail occurred more recently than events for 
which memory is more impoverished (Brown, Rips, & Shevell, 1985, 1986). 
This heuristic fosters forward telescoping for sensational and vivid events.
The Role of Inference Processes
Given the inappropriateness of the "recall and count" model, it is not sur­
prising that inference strategies play a major role in answering frequency ques­
tions. As Bradburn et al. (1987) observed, “Respondents will use any 
information they have in order to generate a reasonable answer" (p. 160). The 
best documented strategies are the use information provided by prccoded 
response alternatives (discussed in detail in the second part of this chapter), 
the decomposition of the recall problem into subparts, the use of the availa- 
bilily heuristic, and reliance on subjective theories of stability and change.
Regarding decomposition strategies, respondents who were asked to report 
the number of restaurant visits were found lo determine a rate of occurrence 
for a limited time period and lo multiply this rate to arrive at an estimate for 
the complete reference period (Blair &  Burton, 1987; Sudman &  Schwarz,
1987). For example, u hypothetical respondent may first determine thal she 
eals out about every weekend, and that she also had dinner at a restaurant this 
Wednesday, but apparently not the week before. Thus she may infer that this 
makes four times a month for the weekends, and let’s say twice for other occa­
sions, thus “eighteen times during the last three months” would be an appro­
priate answer. Note that estimates of this type are likely lo be accurate if the 
respondent's inference rule is adequate, and if exceptions to the usual behavior 
are rare. Thus the nature and use of inference rules involved in decomposi­
tion strategies will be a promising topic for future research.
A second inference strategy, the use of the availability heuristic (Tversky 
&. Kahneman, 1973), relies on ihe ease with which specific instances come 
lo mind. The more easily an instance of the behavior and associated details
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come 10 mind, the more recent or frequent the behavior appears. While reccni 
or frequent events are indeed easier to recall, ease of recall is also influenced 
by other factors, such as the vividness or importance of a memory. Accord­
ingly, the recency and frequency of vivid events is likely lo be overestimated, 
whereas the recency and frequency of pallid events arc underestimated, result­
ing in the frequent finding that rare and vivid events arc ovcrreported whereas 
pallid and mundane events are underreported (Bradburn et al., 1987).
A particularly important inference strategy was identified by Michael Ross 
and his collaborators, who found that respondents answer retrospective ques­
tions by using their present status with regard to the attribute under study as 
a benchmark, and invoke an implicit theory of self to assess whether their 
past standing on that attribute was similar lo or different from (heir current 
status (for reviews, see Ross, 1988; Ross &  Conway, 1986). With regard to 
many variables, people hold implicit theories o f stability and change, often 
related to naive conceptions of life-span development, on which considerable 
interpersonal agreement has been documented (Ross, 1988). These theories 
allow them to infer their previous attitudes and behaviors by using their cur­
rent attitude or behavior as an initial estimate, which they adjust according 
to their implicit theory. The resulting reports of previous attitudes and 
behaviors arc correct to the extent that the implicit theory is accurate (see also 
Nisbett & Wilson, 1977).
So far, this approach has been tested primarily with retrospective reports 
of attitudes and opinions (e.g., Markus, 1986; Ross &  Conway, 1986), but 
it is equally applicable to retrospective reports of behaviors and experiences. 
Frequently, individuals assume a rather high degree of stability, resulting in 
underestimates of the degree of change that has occurred over lime. Accord­
ingly, retrospective estimates of income (Withey, 1954) or of tobacco, mari­
juana, and alcohol consumpiion (Collins, Graham, Hansen, &  Johnson, 1985) 
were found to be heavily influenced by respondents' income or consumption 
habits at the time of interview. On the other hand, when respondents have rea­
son lo believe in change, they will detect change, even though none occurred. 
For example, respondents who participated in a study of skills training (that 
did not improve their skills on any objective measure) subsequently reported 
that their skills were considerably poorer before they participated in the pro­
gram. Presumably, they used their belief in the effectiveness of the training 
program to infer what their skills must have been before they “improved" (Con­
way &  Ross, 1984). Similarly, participants in a pain treatment program were 
found to remember more pain than they had recorded during a baseline period, 
again reflecting their belief in program-induced change (Linton &  Goteslam, 
1983; Linton &  Melin, 1982). As a final example, women’s retrospective
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reports of menstrual distress were found lo be a function of their theory of 
the menstrual cycle: The more respondents believed that their menstrual cycles 
affected their well-being, the more their retrospective reports deviated from 
diary data obtained during the cycles (McFarland, Ross, &. DcCourville,
1988).
Finally, respondents may use their general world knowledge to infer 
reasonable answers. Asked to report the frequency of denial visits, a respon­
dent may refer to normative expectations (e.g., the expectation to have semi­
annual checkups) and may adjust the resulting estimate 10 reflect individual 
deviations (e.g., “ I don't go as often as I should") (Bradburn el al., 1987, p. 
160). This inference strategy is likely to result in estimates that are displaced 
loward the initial anchor supplied by the normative expectations, reflecting 
the general finding that initial anchor values dominule the resulting estimates 
(Tversky &  Kahneman, 1974).
In general, these findings emphasize that retrospective behavioral reports 
are to a large degree theory driven: Respondents are likely lo begin with some 
fragmented recall of the behavior under study and to apply various inference 
rules to arrive at a reasonable estimate, ll will be an important task for future 
research to learn more about the kind-of theories that respondents apply.
Editing the Answer
After having determined a private estimate of the frequency of ihe target 
behavior, the respondent has to report his or her estimate to the researcher. 
The communicated estimate may deviate from the respondent’s private esti­
mate due lo considerations of social desirability and self-presentation. Prac­
tical steps taken to reduce response editing include various techniques to 
assure anonymity; wording the question in a way that implies that the 
undesirable behavior is “usual," thus decreasing respondents’ concern (but 
potentially introducing other biases); using respondents’ own words to label 
the target behavior; and embedding the question into a list of other, less sen­
sitive ones. Sudman and Bradburn (1983, pp. 54ff.) provide a detailed dis­
cussion of various techniques employed by survey researchers.
USING RESPONSE ALTERNATIVES:
WHAT RESPONDENTS LEARN FROM SCALES
The preceding discussion focused on how respondents report behavioral 
frequencies in response to open-ended questions, and emphasized the 
importance of various inference rules that respondents apply to computc
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retrospective estimates. In line with Bradburn et al.’s (1987) observation that 
respondents will “use any information they have to generate a reasonable 
answer” (p. 160), the following sections of this chapter will explore the 
inference rules that respondents apply lo information that is particularly 
salient in the research situation: namely, the information provided by the 
response alternatives presented to them by the researcher.
Frequently, respondents are asked to report their behavior by checking 
ihe appropriate alternative from a list of response categories provided to 
them. While the selected alternative is assumed lo inform Ihe researcher 
about the respondent's behavior, il is frequently overlooked lhal a given sel 
of response alternatives may be far more than a simple “measurement 
device.” Rather, it may also constitute a source of information for the respon­
dent (see Schwarz, 1988; Schwarz &  Hippier, 1987), Specifically, respon­
dents were found to assume that the range of the response alternatives 
provided to them reflects the researcher's knowledge of, or expectations 
about, Ihe distribution of the behavior in the “ real world," To the extent that 
respondents apply this “naive theory" of response scales, the range of the 
response alternatives may affect respondents’ understanding of the question, 
their behavioral reports, and subsequent related judgments. The following 
sections review a series of experiments that bear on these possibilities.
Understanding the Question
Frequently, the behavior under study is ill-defined and open to interpreta­
tion. This is particularly likely when researchers are interested in subjective 
experiences. Assume, for example, (hat respondents are asked lo indicate 
how frequently they were “ really irritated” recently. Before the respondent 
can give an answer, he or she must decide what the researcher means by 
"really irritated." Does this refer lo major irritations such as fights with one's 
spouse or does it refer to minor irritations such as having to wail for service 
in a restaurant? If the respondent has no opportunity to ask the interviewer 
for clarification, or if a well-trained interviewer responds, “Whatever you 
feel is really irritating,” he or she might pick up some pertinent information 
from the questionnaire. One such piece of informalion may be the frequency 
range provided by Ihe scale.
For example, respondents who are asked to report how often they are irri­
tated on a scale ranging from “several times daily” to “ less than once a week" 
may relate the frequency range of the response alternatives to their general 
knowledge about the frequency of minor and major annoyances. Assuming 
that major annoyances are unlikely to occur “several times a day” they may
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consider instances of less severe irritation to be the target of the question 
than may respondents who are presented a scale ranging form “several limes 
a year" to “ less than once every three months." Experimental data support 
this assumption (Schwarz, Strack, Mo, & Chassein, 1988). Respondents 
who reported their experiences on the former scale subsequently reported 
less extreme examples of annoying experiences lhan respondents who were 
given the latter scale. Thus the type of annoying experiences that respon­
dents reported was determined by the frequency range of the response 
alternatives in combination with respondents' general knowledge, rather 
than by the wording of the question per se. Accordingly, the same question 
combined with different frequency scales is likely to assess different 
experiences.
Theoretically, the impact of the response alternatives on respondents’ 
interpretation of the question should be more pronounced the less clearly 
the target behavior is defined. For this reason, questions about subjective 
experiences may be particularly sensitive to the impact of response alterna­
tives because researchers usually refrain from providing a detailed defini­
tion of the target experience so as not to interfere with its subjective nature. 
Ironically, assessing the frequency of a behavior with precoded response 
alternatives may result in doing just what is avoided in the wording of the 
question.
Estimating Behavioral Frequencies
That a list of response alternatives may bias respondents’ behavioral reports 
has repeatedly been observed by survey researchers (e.g., Bradburn, Sudman, 
& Associates, 1979) and a study on leisure lime activities can serve as an illus­
tration. In a study by Schwarz, Hippier, Deutsch, and Sirack (1985, Experi­
ment I), a quota sample of German adults reported how many hours a day 
they spend watching TV. Previous research by Darschin and Frank (1982) indi­
cated that the average daily TV consumption in West Germany was slightly 
more than 2 hours. To lest the impact of different response alternatives, half 
of the sample received a scale ranging in half-hour steps from "up to Vi hour" 
to "more than 2'A hours," while the other half received a scale ranging from 
“up to 2'/i hours” to “more than 4’A hours," as shown in Table 4.1.
The range of the response alternatives had a pronounced impact on 
respondents’ reports. Specifically, only 16.2% of the respondents who were 
presented the low-frequency scale reported watching TV for more than 
Vh hours, while 37.5% of the respondents who were presented the high- 
frcqucncy scale did so.
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T A BLE  4.1 Reported Daily TV Consumption as a Funclion of 
Response Alternatives (N = 132)
Low-Frequency A Iternatives % High-Frequency Alternatives %
Up to 'h hour 7.4 Up to 2*4 hours 62.5
*4 hour (o 1 hour 17.7 2*4 hours to 3 hours 23.4
1 hour 10 1 'A hours 26.5 3 hours to 3*4 hours 7,8
l'/4 hours to 2 hours 14.7 3*4 hours to 4 hours 4.7
2 hours (o 2'h hours 17.7 4 hours to 4*4 hours 1.6
More than 2*4 hours 16.2 More than 4*4 hours 0
SOURCE.' Adapted from Schwarz. Hippier, Deutsch, and Strack (1985).
Mediating processes. Two processes may contribute to this finding. On 
the one hand, the memory research reviewed above suggests that respon­
dents may be unlikely to have detailed episodic memories of behaviors that 
are as frequent and mundane as watching TV. Rather, they may base their 
answers on salient information that allows the computation of a reasonable 
estimate. One source of pertinent information that is highly salient in the 
research context is the range of the response alternatives provided to them. 
Accordingly, respondents may use the range of the response alternatives as 
a frame of reference to estimate their own TV consumption.
As another theoretical possibility, respondents may be sensitive to self- 
presentational concerns when responding. They may be reluctant to check 
a response alternative that seems extreme in the context of the scale and thus 
reflects a presumably unusual behavior. This has been suggested by Brad- 
burn and Danis (1984) in a discussion of higher reports of alcohol consump­
tion in an open than in a closed response format (Bradburn ct al., 1979).
Both hypotheses implicitly assume that respondents use the range of the 
response alternatives to infer which behavior is “usual." In general, respon­
dents were found to assume that the behavior of the Average" person is rep­
resented by the values stated in the middle range of the response scale, and 
that the extremes of the scale also represent the extremes of the 
distribution—at least as long as these values do not appear obscure in the 
context of the respondents’ lay theories (Schwarz et al,, 1985; Schwarz & 
Hippier, 1987).
A number of experimental studies have investigated how these assump­
tions mediate the impact of response alternatives: Is the impact of response 
alternatives on behavioral reports mediated by self-presentation considera-
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(ions or by respondents' use of the range of the response alternatives as a 
frame of reference in estimating frequencies that are difficult to reconstruct 
from memory?
Self-reports versus proxy reports. One way to differentiate beiween the 
iwo proposed mechanisms is to compare the impact of response alternatives 
on reports of one's own behavior (self-reports) and on reports about the 
behavior of other persons (proxy reports). In general, the two process 
assumptions lead to opposite predictions for both types of reports. If the 
impact of response alternatives is mediated by self-presentation concerns, 
scale effects should be stronger when respondents report their own behavior 
than when they report the behavior of friends or distant acquaintances. This 
follows front the assumption that they are presumably more concerned 
about self-presentation than about the image they present of others.
If respondents use the values presented in the scale to compute an esti­
mate, on the other hand, the impacl of scale range should be more pro­
nounced the less other information is available (hat could be used to eomputc 
nn answer. Therefore, the effect of scale range should be smaller when 
respondents report their own behavior than when the report the behavior of 
friends or distant acquaintances, because they can draw upon a broader base 
of information that allows the reconstruction of relevant episodes for self- 
reports.
In one study, American undergraduates were asked to report their own 
weekly TV consumption, the weekly TV consumption of a close friend, 
or the weekly TV consumption of a “typical undergraduate” of their univer­
sity on a scale ranging from "up to 2 'h hours per week” to "more than 
10 hours" or on a scale ranging from “up to 10 hours" to “more than 25 
hours” (Schwarz & Bienias, in press, Experiment I). As predicted by the 
frame of reference hypothesis, the impact of scale range was most pro­
nounced when respondents estimated the TV consumption of a "typical 
undergraduate.” Specifically, 71 % provided estimates of more than 10 hours 
per week on the high-frequency response scale, but only 13% did so on the 
low-frequency scale, resulting in a difference of 58 percentage points. The 
impact of scale range was least pronounced, on the other hand, when 
respondents reported their own TV consumption, with a difference of 32 
percentage points. This pattern of results is opposite to Ihe one predicted by 
the self-presentation hypothesis, which holds that self-reports should be 
most strongly affected. Reports ab<5ut the behavior of close friends fell 
between these extremes, as both hypotheses would predict, with a difference 
of 37 percentage points.
These findings suggest that respondents use the range of the response
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alternatives as a frame of reference in estimating behavioral frequencies, 
and that the less other information they have, the more likely they are to rely 
on this frame. In this regard, it is informative to note that most of the respon­
dents in the “ friends" condition chose their roommates as target persons. It 
therefore comes as little surprise that their estimates of their friends' 
behaviors were only slightly more susceptible to scaling effects than their 
self-reports.
In summary, the impact of the range of the response alternatives 
increased as the availability of relevant information about the target behavior 
decreased. This conclusion is further supported by a study that used an indi­
vidual difference approach to explore the impact of information accessibility 
and self-presentation concerns.
Private and public self-consciousness. Previous research in personality 
psychology has indicated that individuals who focus attention on the self 
provide more accurate self-reporls, presumably because relevant self- 
knowledge is cognitively more accessible to them (see Wicklund, 1982, for 
a review). This suggests that these individuals should be less influenced by 
the ranges of the response scales provided to them bccause they may have 
better access to relevant self-related information. Such a finding would par­
allel the results of the previous study, further supporting the hypothesis that 
the impact of scale range decreases as respondents' available knowledge 
about the behavior under investigation increases.
However, individuals differ not only in the extent to which they pay atten­
tion to their own behaviors and feelings, but also in the extent to which they 
pay attention to the impression they give to others. According to the self­
presentation hypothesis, individuals who care a lot about their public image 
should be more affected by scale range than individuals who pay less atten­
tion to what others think of them.
Accordingly, individuals' disposition to pay attention to what others think 
of them and their disposition to focus on their own behaviors and feelings 
were assessed with the "public” and “private sclf-consciousness" scales 
developed by Fenigslein, Scheier, and Buss (1975). Specifically, American 
college students reported their weekly TV consumption on one of the previ­
ously described high- or low-frequency response scales and their reports 
were analyzed as a function of their private and public self-consciousness 
scores (Schwarz & Bienias, in press, Experiment 3).
As predicted by the frame of reference hypothesis, the impact of scale 
range was more pronounccd for respondents who scored low on private self- 
consciousness than for respondents who scored high on private self- 
consciousness. Specifically, 51% of the respondents who scored /otvon pri-
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vale self-consciousness reported watching TV for more than 10 hours per 
week when given the high-frequency response scale, white only 13% of 
them did so when given ihe low-frequency scale, resulting in a difference of 
38 percentage points. In contrast, respondents who scored high on ihe pri­
vate self-consciousness scale were not significantly affected by the range of 
ihe response scales provided to them. This finding presumably reflects 
ihe higher accessibility of self-related information under high self- 
consciousness, and suggests that these respondents used information 
recalled from memory, rather than information provided by the scales, to 
estimate their TV  consumption. To this extent, the present results parallel 
Ihe findings of the self-reporis versus proxy reports study by indicating that 
Ihe impact of response alternatives decreases as the accessibility of other 
information increases. Finally, respondents'public self-consciousness-that 
is, iheir disposition to focus attention on whai others think of them—did not 
affect the impact of the frequency range of the response scales.
Conclusion. In combination, these findings suggest that respondents use 
the range of the response alternatives provided to them as a frame of refer­
ence in estimating their own behavioral frequencies. Accordingly, the less 
other information is easily acccssiblc in memory, ihe more pronounced is the 
impact of response alternatives on respondents’ reports. Self-presentation con­
cerns, on the other hand, do not seem to play a major role, at least not with 
nonthreaiening questions such as the ones used here. It is conceivable, how­
ever, that self-presentaiion concerns ihat may be elicited by highly threaten­
ing questions will be compounded if the respondent discovers that his or her 
report requires the endorsement of a response alternative that seems extreme 
, in ihe contexL of the list, Thus response alternatives may also affeci behavioral 
reports at the editing stage of the judgmental process, although strong empirical 
evidence for this possibility has not yet been provided, 
i How strongly response alternatives bias respondents’ reports will depend 
f  upon how much the scale deviates form respondents’ actual behavioral fre- 
'<■ quencies. Theoretically, a precoded scale that matches respondents’ actual 
f behavioral frequencies may be cxpected to increase the validity of the 
* obtained estimates. Note, however, that the effects of a given response scale 
may be different for different subpopulations. To the extent that the actual 
I frequency of a behavior varies across subpopulations, a set of response alter- 
|  natives constructed on the basis of pretest data is unlikely lo match the actual 
T. behavior of extreme groups, which are likely to be underrepresented in pre- 
% lests wilh limited sample sizes. Because ihe range of the scale may be used 
|  by all respondents as a frame of reference in estimating behavioral frequen- 
^ cies, it may therefore lend to obscure differences between subpopulations.
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Comparative Judgments
If  respondents use the range of response alternatives to make inferences 
about the distribution of the behavior in the population, we may also expect 
response alternatives to affect a wide range of related judgments to which 
these inferences may be relevant. Most important, checking one from an 
ordered set of response alternatives may be equivalent to determining one's 
own location in a distribution. For example, many of the respondents who 
reported their daily TV  consumption on the low-frequency scale shown in 
Table 4.1, were likely to check a response category in the upper range of that 
scale. This may have suggested to them that they watch more TV than many 
other people. In contrast, respondents who received the high-frequency 
scale were likely to check a category in the lower range of that scale, which 
may have suggested to them that they watch less TV than is "usual." If so, the 
range of the response scale, and respondents' own placement on the scalc, 
may provide comparison information, and respondents may use this infor­
mation for subsequent judgments to which such information may be rele­
vant. The range of the response alternatives therefore may not only 
determine (he responses given to the particular question to which they per­
tain, but influence answers to subsequent questions as well.
To test these considerations, respondents of the leisure-time study 
described above (Schwarz etal., 1985, Experiment I) were asked to evaluate 
how important a role TV plays in their own lives. As expected, respondents 
reported a higher importance of TV  in their own lives when the low- 
frequency range suggested a low TV  consumption to be typical than when 
the high-frequency range suggested that many people watch a lot of TV. Note 
that this was true even though the former respondents reported watching less 
TV than (he latter, as discussed above.
In a related study, the range of the response scale used to report one’s own 
TV consumption affected respondents’ subsequent evaluation of their leisure 
lime even under conditions where the crucial response scale and the leisure 
time question were separated by several buffer items (Schwarz et al., 1985, 
Experiment 2). In this study, respondents reported higher satisfaction with 
the variety of things they do in their leisure time when they had previously 
reported their own TV  consumption on the high-frequency scale, which 
suggested to them that they watch less TV  than average, than when they had 
given their report on the low-frequency scale. Thus it seems that the impact 
of the range of the response alternatives on subsequent comparative judg­
ments is rather robust (see also Schwarz & Scheuring, in press).
Theoretically, the impact of the response alternatives on comparative
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judgments should be more pronounced the less comparison information \% 
easily available from other sources. In addition, researchers should be aware 
Lhai precoded response alternatives may bias respondents' comparative judg­
ments even under conditions where the set of response alternatives perfectly 
matches the actual distribution of behavior, thus introducing little bias in 
behavioral reports. While individuals who were not exposed to the response 
scale may use varying standards of comparison (e.g., based on their refer­
ence group), exposure to a given response scale may result in the use of the 
salient comparison information provided by the scale. To this extent, judg­
ments obtained from a sample that was exposed to the response scale may 
differ from judgments prevailing in the population to which one may want to 
generalize the obtained results.
And What About the Users of a Respondent’s Report?
However, respondents are not the only ones who use the range of 
response alternatives as a frame of reference in making comparative judg­
ments. Rather, potentiul users of a respondent’s report arc also likely to be 
affcclcd by the response scale in their interpretation of the reported behavior. 
In one study, experienced physicians and advanced students of medicine 
were more likely to assume that having a given physical symptom twice a 
week requires medical attention when this frequency was reported on a low- 
rather than a high-frequency range scale (Schwarz, Bless, Bohner, 
Harlacher, &  Kellenbenz, 1988, Experiment I). For example, practicing 
physicians were more likely to recommend that a fictitious patient should 
see a doctor if the patient reported vomiting twice a week on a low- rather 
than high-frequency range scale. Thus experienced professional users of 
symptom checklists evaluated the same frequency report differently, 
depending on the context provided by the frequency range of the response 
scale.
CONCLUSIONS
What are the implications of the reviewed findings for questionnaire con­
struction? Most important, the reviewed findings demonstrate that respon­
dents are unlikely to answer quantitative autobiographical questions on the 
basis of a “recall and count” procedure. While researchers may increase the 
likelihood that respondents will attempt to use a recall and count strategy by 
asking specific questions pertaining to a well-anchored short reference
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period, respondenis will usually base their answers on some fragmented 
recall from which they attempt to infer a plausible estimate using various 
inference strategies. In doing so, respondents “use any information they have 
to generate a reasonable answer" (Bradburn et al., 1987, p. 160). Accord­
ingly, the traditional distinction between "opinion questions," which are pre­
sumably answered on the basis of somewhat unreliable judgmental 
processes, and “ factual questions," which are presumably answered on the 
basis of more reliable recall from memory, is misleading. As much as 
answering opinion questions requires a considerable degree of recall (see, 
e.g., the discussions by Bodenhausen &  Wyer, 1987; Schwarz & Strack, in 
press; Strack &  Martin, 1987; Tourangeau & Rasinski, 1988), answering 
quantitative “ factual" questions requires a considerable degree of inference 
and judgment. A judgmental approach to retrospective reports, emphasizing 
the inference and estimation strategies that underlie respondents' reports, 
may therefore prove to be an important supplement to current research on 
autobiographical memory, and is likely to improve our understanding of 
basic judgmental processes as well as the collection of retrospective data in 
theory testing and applied social and psychological research.
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